Posted by **interes** at May 24, 2014

English | 2013 | ISBN: 9814417394 | 236 pages | PDF | 1,6 MB

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition.

Posted by **interes** at May 27, 2016

English | 2007 | ISBN: 0865715874, 0865711895 | 128 pages | PDF | 0,9 MB

Posted by **Underaglassmoon** at Feb. 12, 2016

Springer | Economic Theory | Feb. 2 2016 | ISBN-10: 3319289969 | 137 pages | pdf | 1.8 mb

Authors: Li, Deng-Feng

Presents improvements to modern interval-valued game theory and methods, including new linear programming models that surpass traditional and fuzzy optimizations

Proposes innovative game methods for interactive management problems with interval-valued data

Designed for readers across various disciplines

Posted by **tanas.olesya** at Oct. 6, 2014

Springer; 2nd edition | August 22, 2007 | English | ISBN: 3540729445 | 336 pages | PDF | 3 MB

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Posted by **ChrisRedfield** at July 16, 2014

Published: 2013-11-07 | ISBN: 3642395481 | PDF | 150 pages | 3 MB

Posted by **roxul** at Dec. 25, 2013

English | 2014 | ISBN: 3642395481 | 150 pages | PDF | 4,5 MB

Posted by **nebulae** at Nov. 1, 2013

English | ISBN: 3642395481 | 2014 | 150 pages | PDF | 3 MB

Posted by **lenami** at April 25, 2011

Publisher: Springer | ISBN: 3540729445 | edition 2007 | PDF | 336 pages | 3 mb

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. The study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set).

Posted by **loverka** at Nov. 6, 2010

Publisher: Springer | October 3, 2007 | 328 pages | ISBN:3540729445 | PDF | 2,9 Mb

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. The study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set).

Posted by **enmoys** at June 1, 2016

2011 | 170 Pages | ISBN: 1608456528 | PDF | 3 MB